For me, the first world war is more interesting than the second. Now, don't get me wrong; WWII is still utterly fascinating. I especially love the technology, from the A-Bomb to the B-29 to the FG-42 and plenty more. But when reading about WWII, I always felt like the Axis were on borrowed time. Even if they did everything right, there were still barriers to success that might well have been insurmountable. The very rise of the Nazis and their pre-war success seems rather unlikely now, as does the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the fall of France. Even if they somehow knocked Britain out of the war in 1940 or 1941 and took Moscow in 1941 and cut off the Caucuses in 1942, what's to stop Britain from re-entering the war later and with American help? World War I was much more evenly matched, and I feel like either side could have won before the actual peace. World War I is also a much greyer conflict, with Germany and Austria-Hungary really being no worse than the Entente.
My fascination with WWI also extends to counterfactuals, and as such, a Central Powers victory is obviously interesting to me. As such, I thought I'd offer up some thoughts on what such a world would likely look like.
German war aims
First, let's talk about German war aims and what a likely peace would look like. This will, of course, depend on the scenario. As I have chosen to focus on a late CP victory (1917-1918), I will outline likely war aims in such a scenario.
Western Europe:
In my opinion, the most likely scenario for western Europe would be either a status quo peace or minor annexations by Germany.
A map of the "Septemberprogramm", taken from here
Many proponents of a harsh peace point to the Septemberprogramm, seen above, as proof of Germany's harsh war aims. However, these people miss the crucial point that the Septemberprogramm was never officially adopted as policy. It was essentially a wishlist given to the government by a few factions within Germany. This will be a common theme throughout this section of the post: Germany didn't really have a coherent goal of what they wanted out of the war.
So if not the Septemberprogramm, what would form the basis of the peace in the west? The Germans would have the following considerations:
Additionally, it is worth mentioning the factions behind the various peace proposals, in order to see what the people most likely to be in charge at the end of the war wanted. Most of the Reichstag was in favor of minimal annexations, while many industrialists and Hindenburg and especially Luddendorf were in favor of harsh peace deals. Now, many think that because Hindenburg and Luddendorf (H-L from here on) were in charge from 1917-1918, Germany would impose harsh terms. These people point to the Septemberprogramm, addressed above, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, addressed below. However, H-L were only in power because of the 1851 Prussian Siege Law. Said law would no longer apply once hostilities ceased, and so the civilian government, which favored mild(er) terms, would be making the peace. I highly doubt H-L would stage a coup against the Kaiser, and if they did the army certainly wouldn't go along with it.
Africa/Asia/Pacific:
Much of this section is based on the wonderful post by @Eric C Johnson here, so full kudos to them. What the peace deal here boils down to is that given the choice between Germany getting some colonies or getting Belgium's channel ports, they choose the former every time. Southwest Africa likely still goes to South Africa, and the Pacific colonies and Kamerun are gone and won't be missed too much. The Germans would likely get Tanganyika. Togoland, Nauru, and Palau back, and get New Caledonia and France's treaty port as well. They also get a protecrotate over Morocco, which would be nominally independent. Britain would get the right to build their Cape-Cairo railway in exchange for German property being respected in Namibia.
Eastern Europe:
The elephant in the room. What would Eastern Europe look like? This is the least speculative of the three, since this actually happened in OTL. However, many people miss the context of why it happened the way it did.
Initial offers:
The first Treaty of Brest-Litovsk offered by the Germans was relatively mild compared to its later incarnation.
A map of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
The area in red, shown in the map above, was all the Russians would've ceded had they accepted peace as late as December 1917. Why didn't this happen? The Bolsheviks didn't want to cede any land, and while Lenin was in favor of making peace, Trotsky, after initially voting in favor of it, decided against it and advocated for a "No War, No Peace" policy. Upon hearing of the Bolsheviks negotiating in bad faith, the Germans launched Operation Faustschlag (BTW easily one of the coolest codenames of all time and one of my top five favorite German words), taking Belarus, Ukraine, and the rest of the Baltics. The Bolsheviks then had to agree to the much harsher version we all know and love. Why is this important? Because most CP victories have the US not enter the war. Without the US entering the war, the Bolsheviks are probably much less sure of German defeat and revolution, and so might accept the first peace.
Again, it is important to note which factions within the Reich who supported what. Please note that the following quotes were found by another user on this site in another thread which I have since lost track of. All credit for finding this source goes to them. From Herwig Holger's Tunes of Glory at the Twilight Stage: The Bad Homburg Crown Council and the Evolution of German Statecraft, 1917/1918 (emphasis mine):
Likely peace deal
In my opinion, a likely peace deal looks something like this:
Effects of a CP victory:
Nazi/Commie France/Britain? WWII?
While a revanchist, extremist Entente might make for a good story, it's not very likely. Germany can't force humiliating terms on Britain, who can still claim victory due to keeping Belgium intact and gaining some colonies. And while many people draw comparisons between France and OTL's interwar Germany, they miss the fact that:
Fate of the Habsburgs and Ottomans
Despite what many think, the Austro-Hungarian Empire wasn't doomed to collapse. If they won the war, the army would have fought too long and too hard to just let the empire disolve; they fought on even after it fell apart in OTL! With Karl I on the throne, change was coming, and the solidarity of an entire eigth of the population having fought and bled together would hold the empire together. Heck, even the Empire's pre-war problems were not indicitave of inevitable collapse. Despite the awkwardness of the 1867 system, Christopher Clark notes in The Sleepwalkers that:
As for the Ottomans, their collapse is more likely, but not inevitable. Their territory has been greatly reduced, allowing for easier administration. Syria and northern Iraq, which they still hold ITTL, are both oil rich, so they're likely to survive once the oil wealth really starts flowing. Unfortunately, this is bad news for the Armenians and Greeks within the empire, who likely continue to suffer greatly at the hands of the Ottomans. I'm not so sure Germany would intervene on their behalf. Then again, it's not like they faired too well in OTL either.
The German Jackboot
Domestic affairs
Internal German politics are likely similar to OTL, with the SPD and Zentrum being the greatest parties in the Reichstag. As early as 1914, Wilhelm II had promised the abolition of Prussia's three class suffrage system, and the other German states probably follow suit. He had promised further reform on Easter 1917, and while it wouldn't be as extensive as OTL's 1918 reforms, we still probably see women get the right to vote. H-L would be forced to step down, as their power derived from the 1851 Siege Law. Germany's culture probably isn't quite as liberal as OTL's Weimar culture, but it would be pretty close.
Would there be a vindication of militarism? No. Germany was no more militaristic than Britain or France before the war. Contrary to popular belief, people in 1914 were well aware of how terrible a modern war would be. As noted in Ring of Steel, Germans didn't show intense war enthusiasm. There were demonstrations in support of Austria-Hungary in the wake of the assassaination, but the prevailing atmosphere in 1914 was one of fear and apprehension. People joined up not out of some romantic image of war as an adventure, but because they percieved a threat to their home and loved ones. As noted in Blood and Iron: The Rise and Fall of the German Empire by Katja Hoyer, German nationalism was defensive in nature. After the occupation and bloodshed of the Napoleonic Wars, the incessant warfare of the 18th century, and especially the unmitigated disaster of the Thirty Years War, the German people were united by a feeling of a common need to defend their nation from attack. It was this defensive nationalism that provided fuel for the war effort during World War I. After the war, Germans would be just as adverse to war as they were in 1914, if not moreso. This precludes any adventurism in Russia after WWI. Even if German leadership was trigger-happy (it wasn't), I highly doubt the army would go back into Russia to topple the Bolsheviks after four years of brutal, senseless slaughter, and I highly doubt the people at home would allow it either.
Germany would be quite the powerhouse post war, even if they don't get the full B-L deal (which they still might). The Kaiser's army would have access to Ottoman, Romanian, and Galician oil, allowing for much greater motorization than OTL's Wehrmacht. They would also still have the Prussian conscription system, allowing for a much higher quality pool of reserves than OTL's Wehrmacht had. Without OTL's restrictions, the military would basically be almost what pop culture things the Wehrmacht was. Obviously not quite that, but still very formidable. It's likely the navy starts focusing on torpedo boats, submarines, destroyers, cruisers, and eventually aircraft carriers; ships designed to raid commerce and make sure their colonies can be defended. Additionally, German science and industry would still be world leaders, just as before the war. The German language would be much more widely spoken, and German pop culture would be much more widespread and influential. Most of this would also be true with a surviving Weimar Republic (minus the military parts), as without the Nazis Germany would pretty much automatically still be a world power.
Colonial affairs
In the event that the Germans still have colonies after the war, what would it be like there? Most people assume it would be a proto-Nazi hellscape based on the Herero and Namaqua genocide and the Maji-Maji rebellion. First, let me just say that yes, these did happen, and yes, they were horriffic, and no, there is no justification for these. It should be noted, however, that the Reichstag condemned the Herero genocide and did their best to stop it. This is the part of the story most people know. What most people don't know is what happened next. From Wikipedia (emphasis mine):
Eastern Europe, Brest-Litovsk, and Mitteleuropa
What would life in a CP victory be like in Germany's new sphere of influence? Contrary to popular belief, the Germans were not about to go ham and start Generalplan Osting everyone.
Gasp, you say. The Germans are evil and need the WAllies to pound said evilness out of them! Of course they'll go all Final Solution on everyone! After all, the Nazis didn't come from nowhere, and look at their war crimes and the Herero genocide!
The problems with this argument are numerous. First off, the idea that Germany in WWI was even remotely comparable to the Nazis in brutality and anti-slavism is absurd and quite frankly whitewashes the Nazis. For reference, the Russian Empire lost around 3.3 million people in WW1, or around 1.9% of its population. Of these, 1.5 million, or around 45%, were civilians. Meanwhile, the Soviets lost 27 million people in WW2, of which 19 million, or around 70%, were civilians. That's 15% of its population. When looking at these numbers, it should become clear that the Germans weren't fighting a war of extermination in the east in WW1.
Second, wartime behavior is not the same as peacetime behavior. In war, it becomes a lot easier to justify atrocities due to a siege mentality. If you're not actively under threat, you're not nearly as likely to commit atrocities. And we don't have to speculate; we can look at what the Entente did in OTL. With regards to the Rape of Belgium, modern estimates place the dead at around 6,800 Belgians. The Germans also deported Belgians and Frenchmen to be used as forced labor. However, the French and Russians did the same thing in Alcase-Lorraine and East Prussia, respectively. The Russians looted systematically, deported thousands of people, and killed 1,500+ people. Importantly, reprisals against civilians occured at the same rate as German ones against Belgium. The French behaved similarly in Alcase-Lorraine. As to Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality, Britain did the same thing in Greece and Persia. Now compare that to after the war; there weren't mass atrocities in the Ruhr in 1923 like there were in Alcase-Lorraine in 1914.
What about the east? People often draw comparisons between German expansion eastward in WW1 and WW2 to draw a parallel between the 2nd and 3rd Reichs. I've already pointed out the blatant flaws in this, but regarding the German occupation of Ukraine, it was harsh. During the Hetmanate especially, the Germans conducted reprisals against civilians, established their own courts to try any Ukrainians who committed a "crime" against the German occupiers, arrested any socialist leaders in the Rada, and banned railway workers from striking. And while these measures were harsh, it should be noted that these were wartime measures that would likely have not continued in peacetime. It should also be noted that while the Hetmanate was unpopular and hardly a benign regime, giving land back to wealthy landowners, it wasn't all bad. The economy began to recover slightly, there was relative internal stability, and public health, culture, science, and education were developed. That's not to say the Hetmanate was good by any means, but it wasn't the worst regime either.
People often draw parallels between the Mitteleuropa states in the east and Germany's colonies to show how brutal Germany would be, but I think it's actually an apt comparison to show the opposite. If the Germans invested heavily in health care, infrastructure, and education for their colonies, they'd at least do the same in eastern Europe, especially since eastern Europe is obviously white. The relationship would obviously be extractive and one-sided, with the eastern states having to follow Germany's lead in foreign policy, but they would be able to pretty much run themselves internally. It'd be like a weird mix between the EU and the Warsaw Pact, probably somewhat similar to the British dominion system. Of course, you also avoid Stalin's collectivization and Hitler's rampage, which are both automatically good things. The situation wouldn't be as good as full independence, but it wouldn't be nearly as bad as life under the Tsars, Stalin, or the Nazis.
Broader effects:
Without a second World War, the following things would likely happen:
Conclusions
Despite what some would have you believe, a Central Powers victory would not be a dystopian nightmare, and would likely be better than OTL. Of course, WWII and the rise of the Nazis was pretty unlikely, and an Entente victory where the Weimar Republic survives would also be better than OTL. And the optimal scenario is no WWI at all.
If you disagree with what I've said here, feel free to explain why you think I'm wrong, but please do so politely.
My fascination with WWI also extends to counterfactuals, and as such, a Central Powers victory is obviously interesting to me. As such, I thought I'd offer up some thoughts on what such a world would likely look like.
German war aims
First, let's talk about German war aims and what a likely peace would look like. This will, of course, depend on the scenario. As I have chosen to focus on a late CP victory (1917-1918), I will outline likely war aims in such a scenario.
Western Europe:
In my opinion, the most likely scenario for western Europe would be either a status quo peace or minor annexations by Germany.
A map of the "Septemberprogramm", taken from here
Many proponents of a harsh peace point to the Septemberprogramm, seen above, as proof of Germany's harsh war aims. However, these people miss the crucial point that the Septemberprogramm was never officially adopted as policy. It was essentially a wishlist given to the government by a few factions within Germany. This will be a common theme throughout this section of the post: Germany didn't really have a coherent goal of what they wanted out of the war.
So if not the Septemberprogramm, what would form the basis of the peace in the west? The Germans would have the following considerations:
- If possible, they want ports/bases on the English Channel
- The French iron mines at Briey-Longwy would be a valuable aquisition
- Luxembourg would be annexed
- They would want to annex bits of Belgium to flank French fortifications
- Keep Germany off the Channel at all costs and protect Belgian sovereignty
- Keep France intact
Additionally, it is worth mentioning the factions behind the various peace proposals, in order to see what the people most likely to be in charge at the end of the war wanted. Most of the Reichstag was in favor of minimal annexations, while many industrialists and Hindenburg and especially Luddendorf were in favor of harsh peace deals. Now, many think that because Hindenburg and Luddendorf (H-L from here on) were in charge from 1917-1918, Germany would impose harsh terms. These people point to the Septemberprogramm, addressed above, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, addressed below. However, H-L were only in power because of the 1851 Prussian Siege Law. Said law would no longer apply once hostilities ceased, and so the civilian government, which favored mild(er) terms, would be making the peace. I highly doubt H-L would stage a coup against the Kaiser, and if they did the army certainly wouldn't go along with it.
Africa/Asia/Pacific:
Much of this section is based on the wonderful post by @Eric C Johnson here, so full kudos to them. What the peace deal here boils down to is that given the choice between Germany getting some colonies or getting Belgium's channel ports, they choose the former every time. Southwest Africa likely still goes to South Africa, and the Pacific colonies and Kamerun are gone and won't be missed too much. The Germans would likely get Tanganyika. Togoland, Nauru, and Palau back, and get New Caledonia and France's treaty port as well. They also get a protecrotate over Morocco, which would be nominally independent. Britain would get the right to build their Cape-Cairo railway in exchange for German property being respected in Namibia.
Eastern Europe:
The elephant in the room. What would Eastern Europe look like? This is the least speculative of the three, since this actually happened in OTL. However, many people miss the context of why it happened the way it did.
Initial offers:
The first Treaty of Brest-Litovsk offered by the Germans was relatively mild compared to its later incarnation.
A map of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
The area in red, shown in the map above, was all the Russians would've ceded had they accepted peace as late as December 1917. Why didn't this happen? The Bolsheviks didn't want to cede any land, and while Lenin was in favor of making peace, Trotsky, after initially voting in favor of it, decided against it and advocated for a "No War, No Peace" policy. Upon hearing of the Bolsheviks negotiating in bad faith, the Germans launched Operation Faustschlag (BTW easily one of the coolest codenames of all time and one of my top five favorite German words), taking Belarus, Ukraine, and the rest of the Baltics. The Bolsheviks then had to agree to the much harsher version we all know and love. Why is this important? Because most CP victories have the US not enter the war. Without the US entering the war, the Bolsheviks are probably much less sure of German defeat and revolution, and so might accept the first peace.
Again, it is important to note which factions within the Reich who supported what. Please note that the following quotes were found by another user on this site in another thread which I have since lost track of. All credit for finding this source goes to them. From Herwig Holger's Tunes of Glory at the Twilight Stage: The Bad Homburg Crown Council and the Evolution of German Statecraft, 1917/1918 (emphasis mine):
The factions in 1918 stood thus:"The protocols of the February 1918 meetings of their caucus leaders are liberally sprinkled with declarations against annexations and indemnities: Deputies Hermann Pachnicke, Georg Gothein, Otto Fischbeck, and Friedrich Naumann of the People's Progressive Party (FVP) repeatedly came out against a land grab in Poland, Courland, and Livonia. Matthia Erzberger and Karl Trimborn of the Center Party as well as Philipp Scheidemann of the Social Democrats (SPD) resolutely supported their stance. And both Gothein (FVP) and Eduard David (SPD) on occasion warned about the dangerous degree of political interference by the army's ruling duumvirate of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Indeed, these leaders must have felt greatly relieved five days after the Homburg Crown Council when Kuhlmann informed government officials that "any kind of wars of conquest ... are absolutely alien to German policies" in the east."
While there were plenty of factions within the Reich advocating for a harsh peace deal and even interventions in Russia, the factions that would actually be in power after the war were much less inclined for such outlandish ideas. This includes the Polish Border Strip, which was pretty unpopular with the politicians in the Reichstag. Likely you only see tiny border adjustments."The deliberations at Bad Homburg on February 13, 1918 produced a renewed Drang nach Osten not unlike the days of the Teutonic Knights. In one corner had stood the emperor, unabashedly pursuing dynastic ambitions in Finland, Poland, and the Baltic states with the zeal of a medieval potentate; decidedly anti-Bolshevik and desirous of dismembering "Great Russia." In another had stood the German navy, studiously disinterested in the east because the war at sea was to be won in the waters surrounding the British Isles before one turned to the Baltic, Barents, and Black seas. In yet another corner at Bad Homburg had stood Ludendorff and the "demi-gods" of the General Staff - vociferously assisted by industry, the Pan German League, and the Fatherland Party who, victorious on the eastern battlefields, were without a realistic concept of Ostpolitik, save their desire to lay their hands on as much real estate as possible. No less than one million German soldiers stood occupation in the east in March 1918, at a time when the great offensive in France foundered before Amiens for lack of infantry. And finally, Kuhlmann had stood virtually alone, the one person with at least a tenuous grasp of die grosse Politik. The foreign secretary was convinced that Russia needed to be included in any future concert of Europe, that the Brest-Litovsk peace was but a stop-gap measure (Provisorium) requiring revision at a future European peace conference, and that no Russian government could accept the permanent reduction of the state to pre-Petrine borders without access to either the Baltic or the Black seas. Moreover, he correctly discerned that German domination "Great Russia" and the "borderland states" would never be accepted by the Allied and Associated Powers. Yet his concept stood little chance of success. Kuhlmann became strangely silent after Bad Homburg: at two future crown councils at Spa (May 1 he uttered hardly a word; to a third (July 2) he was not even invited. A belated appeal in March 1918 to Chancellor v. Hertling to uphold the primacy of the political branch fell upon deaf ears."
Likely peace deal
In my opinion, a likely peace deal looks something like this:
- Belgian sovereignty is fully restored
- The Franco-German border remains as it was before the war; Briey-Longwy is placed under German lease for twenty years
- Luxembourg is annexed as a state into the Reich
- Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and Riga are ceded to Germany, and Finland is granted independence; Ukraine, the Baltics, and Belarus might also be ceded depending on how negotiations go
- Germany cedes Kamerun to France and Britain, Namibia to South Africa, German New Guinea to Australia, and their Pacific holdings to Japan
- Germany retains Tanganyika, Togoland, Kiaotschou Bay, Nauru, and Palau; Germany recognizes Japanese influence in Manchuria in exchange
- Germany gains a protecrotate over Morocco and gains New Caledonia and the French treaty port in China
- Bulgaria annexes Macedonia in Serbia
- Serbia is reduced to a Habsburg puppet
- The Austro-Italian border undergoes minor adjustments
- Britain gains Palestine and the lower half of Mesopotamia, as well as the land connecting them
- France gains OTL Lebanon
- The Ottomans gain the Dodecanese from Italy
- France agrees to pay reparations to Germany
- The Entente agree not to restrict German access to global markets
Effects of a CP victory:
Nazi/Commie France/Britain? WWII?
While a revanchist, extremist Entente might make for a good story, it's not very likely. Germany can't force humiliating terms on Britain, who can still claim victory due to keeping Belgium intact and gaining some colonies. And while many people draw comparisons between France and OTL's interwar Germany, they miss the fact that:
- Germany going Nazi was actually fairly unlikely, and had the Nazis not come to power when they did, the Weimar Republic probably would've survived. And without the Nazis, there wouldn't have been a WWII.
- A France that lost WWI would be more akin to OTL's post WWII Germany. France would have just lost two wars to Germany within a 50 year span, the latter of which was devastating for them. They simply wouldn't have the will, demographics, or industry needed to take on Germany again.
Fate of the Habsburgs and Ottomans
Despite what many think, the Austro-Hungarian Empire wasn't doomed to collapse. If they won the war, the army would have fought too long and too hard to just let the empire disolve; they fought on even after it fell apart in OTL! With Karl I on the throne, change was coming, and the solidarity of an entire eigth of the population having fought and bled together would hold the empire together. Heck, even the Empire's pre-war problems were not indicitave of inevitable collapse. Despite the awkwardness of the 1867 system, Christopher Clark notes in The Sleepwalkers that:
He further notes that the problems of nationality were surmountable:Balancing the complex array of forces that resulted [from national and ideological conflicts within the empire] to sustain a working majority was a complex task requiring tact, flexibility and strategic imagination, but the careers of the last three Austrian prime ministers before 1914, Beck, Bienerth and Stürgkh, showed – despite intermittent breakdowns in the system – that it could be done.
Furthermore, as Alexander Watson notes in Ring of Steel, despite intense political strife, most nationalities wanted to work to improve their standing within the system, and the mobilization in 1914 proved the loyalty of the majority of the population to the Habsburgs. By the way, both The Sleepwalkers and Ring of Steel are excellent books. I haven't read all the way through them, but they provide a great look at 1914. Given enough time, Austria-Hungary would become a sizable economic power, matching if not surpassing France....case-by-case adjustments to specific demands suggested that the system might eventually produce a comprehensive mesh of guarantees for nationality rights within an agreed framework. And there were signs that the administration was getting better at responding to the material demands of the regions.
As for the Ottomans, their collapse is more likely, but not inevitable. Their territory has been greatly reduced, allowing for easier administration. Syria and northern Iraq, which they still hold ITTL, are both oil rich, so they're likely to survive once the oil wealth really starts flowing. Unfortunately, this is bad news for the Armenians and Greeks within the empire, who likely continue to suffer greatly at the hands of the Ottomans. I'm not so sure Germany would intervene on their behalf. Then again, it's not like they faired too well in OTL either.
The German Jackboot
Domestic affairs
Internal German politics are likely similar to OTL, with the SPD and Zentrum being the greatest parties in the Reichstag. As early as 1914, Wilhelm II had promised the abolition of Prussia's three class suffrage system, and the other German states probably follow suit. He had promised further reform on Easter 1917, and while it wouldn't be as extensive as OTL's 1918 reforms, we still probably see women get the right to vote. H-L would be forced to step down, as their power derived from the 1851 Siege Law. Germany's culture probably isn't quite as liberal as OTL's Weimar culture, but it would be pretty close.
Would there be a vindication of militarism? No. Germany was no more militaristic than Britain or France before the war. Contrary to popular belief, people in 1914 were well aware of how terrible a modern war would be. As noted in Ring of Steel, Germans didn't show intense war enthusiasm. There were demonstrations in support of Austria-Hungary in the wake of the assassaination, but the prevailing atmosphere in 1914 was one of fear and apprehension. People joined up not out of some romantic image of war as an adventure, but because they percieved a threat to their home and loved ones. As noted in Blood and Iron: The Rise and Fall of the German Empire by Katja Hoyer, German nationalism was defensive in nature. After the occupation and bloodshed of the Napoleonic Wars, the incessant warfare of the 18th century, and especially the unmitigated disaster of the Thirty Years War, the German people were united by a feeling of a common need to defend their nation from attack. It was this defensive nationalism that provided fuel for the war effort during World War I. After the war, Germans would be just as adverse to war as they were in 1914, if not moreso. This precludes any adventurism in Russia after WWI. Even if German leadership was trigger-happy (it wasn't), I highly doubt the army would go back into Russia to topple the Bolsheviks after four years of brutal, senseless slaughter, and I highly doubt the people at home would allow it either.
Germany would be quite the powerhouse post war, even if they don't get the full B-L deal (which they still might). The Kaiser's army would have access to Ottoman, Romanian, and Galician oil, allowing for much greater motorization than OTL's Wehrmacht. They would also still have the Prussian conscription system, allowing for a much higher quality pool of reserves than OTL's Wehrmacht had. Without OTL's restrictions, the military would basically be almost what pop culture things the Wehrmacht was. Obviously not quite that, but still very formidable. It's likely the navy starts focusing on torpedo boats, submarines, destroyers, cruisers, and eventually aircraft carriers; ships designed to raid commerce and make sure their colonies can be defended. Additionally, German science and industry would still be world leaders, just as before the war. The German language would be much more widely spoken, and German pop culture would be much more widespread and influential. Most of this would also be true with a surviving Weimar Republic (minus the military parts), as without the Nazis Germany would pretty much automatically still be a world power.
Colonial affairs
In the event that the Germans still have colonies after the war, what would it be like there? Most people assume it would be a proto-Nazi hellscape based on the Herero and Namaqua genocide and the Maji-Maji rebellion. First, let me just say that yes, these did happen, and yes, they were horriffic, and no, there is no justification for these. It should be noted, however, that the Reichstag condemned the Herero genocide and did their best to stop it. This is the part of the story most people know. What most people don't know is what happened next. From Wikipedia (emphasis mine):
As we can clearly see, the idea that the Germans were insanely brutal in the years leading up to WWI is a false one. Now, I am NOT TRYING TO DEFEND GERMAN COLONIALISM. Colonialism is evil and cannot be justified no matter what. However, the Germans were better than most. Why would these policies continue after the war?As a result of the colonial wars in South West Africa and East Africa, which had been caused by poor treatment of native peoples, it was considered necessary to change the German colonial administration, in favor of a more scientific approach to the employment of the colonies that improved the lives of the people in them. Therefore, the highest authority in colonial administration, the Colonial Department (Kolonialabteilung) was separated from the Foreign Office and, in May 1907, it became its own ministry, the Imperial Colonial Office (Reichskolonialamt).
The creator of the new colonial policy was a successful banker and private-sector restructurer, Bernhard Dernburg from Darmstadt, who was placed in charge of the Colonial Department in September 1906 and retained the role as Secretary of State of the revamped Colonial Office until 1910. Entrenched incompetents were screened out and summarily removed from office and "not a few had to stand trial. Replacing the misfits was a new breed of efficient, humane, colonial civil servant, usually the product of Dernburg's own creation, the ... Colonial Institute at Hamburg."[95] In African protectorates, especially Togoland and German East Africa, "improbably advanced and humane administrations emerged."[96] Dernburg went on tours of the colonies, to learn about their problems first-hand and find solutions. Capital investments by banks were secured with public funds of the imperial treasury to minimize risk. Dernburg, as a former banker, facilitated such thinking; he saw his commission to also turn the colonies into paying propositions. He oversaw large-scale expansion of infrastructure. Every African protectorate built rail lines to the interior.[97] Dar es Salaam evolved into "the showcase city of all of tropical Africa,"[98] Lomé grew into the "prettiest city in western Africa",[99] and Qingdao in China was, "in miniature, as German a city as Hamburg or Bremen".[100] Whatever the Germans constructed in their colonies was made to last.[98] Scientific and technical institutions for colonial purposes were established or expanded, in order to develop the colonies on these terms. Two of these, the Hamburg Colonial Institute and the German Colonial School are predecessor organizations of the modern universities of Hamburg and Kassel.
Dernburg declared that the indigenous population in the protectorates "was the most important factor in our colonies" and this was affirmed by new laws and initiatives.[95] Corporal punishment was abolished. Every colony in Africa and the Pacific established the beginnings of a public school system,[101] and every colony built and staffed hospitals.[102] In some colonies, native agricultural holdings were encouraged and supported.[103] In January 1909, Derburg said "The goal must be colonies closely bound to the Fatherland, administratively independent, intellectually self-sufficient, and healthy."
Wilhelm Solf, who was Colonial Secretary from 1911 until 1918, also undertook tours in Africa in 1912 and 1913. The resulting impressions informed his colonial plans, which included an expansion of the powers of the governors and a ban on forced labor for Africans.[95] As governor of Samoa, he had referred to the islanders as "unsere braunen Schützlinge" (our brown charges), who could be guided but not forced.[104] Similarly, Heinrich Schnee, governor of East Africa from 1912, proclaimed that "the dominant feature of my administration [will be] ... the welfare of the natives entrusted into my care."[105] Solf also advocated a network of motorways in the colonies. He secured support for this comparatively peaceful colonial policy, instead of the highly militarized approach that had been taken up to this point, from all parties in the Reichstag, except for the right.
There were no further major revolts in the German colonies after 1905 and the economic efficiency of the overseas possessions rapidly increased, as a result of these new policies and improvements in shipping, especially the establishment of scheduled services with refrigerated holds, increased the amount of agricultural products from the colonies, exotic fruits and spices, that were sold to the public in Germany. Between 1906 and 1914, the production of palm oil and cocoa in the colonies doubled, the rubber production of the African colonies quadrupled, and the cotton exports from German East Africa increased tenfold. The total trade between Germany and its colonies increased from 72 million marks in 1906 to 264 million marks in 1913. Due to this economic growth, the income from colonial taxes and duties increased sixfold. Instead of being dependent on financial support from Germany, the colonies became or were on track to become financially independent. By 1914, only German New Guinea, Kiautschou, and the African Schutztruppen were subsidized.[106] "The colonial economy was thriving ... and roads, railways, shipping and telegraph communications were up to the minute."[96]
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In the years before the outbreak of the World War, British colonial officers viewed the Germans as deficient in "colonial aptitude", but "whose colonial administration was nevertheless superior to those of the other European states".[111]
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The British position that Germany was a uniquely brutal and cruel colonial power originated during the war; it had not been said during peacetime.[115]
- They clearly worked, as the German colonial economy grew by leaps and bounds, and there were no more rebellions after 1905.
- These policies were supported by everyone in the Reichstag except the right, and given that the SPD would be the largest party after the war, support for these would continue.
- Wilhelm Solf would still be in charge of the colonies. Who was he? From Wikipedia:
The idea that German Africa would have been a hellscape similar to the Congo Free State is utterly unfounded and absurd. The situation wouldn't have been ideal, true, but it wouldn't be as bad a some suggest."Solf was a man of quite unusual talent, clear-thinking, sensitive to the nuances of Samoan attitudes and opinion."[3] He was known as a liberal, painstaking and competent administrator.[4] Solf included Samoan traditions in his government programs but never hesitated to step in assertively, including banishment from Samoa in severe cases, when his position as the Kaiser's deputy was challenged. Under Solf's direction, plantation agriculture was further encouraged,which in his judgment provided the soundest basis for the colony's economic development.[5] In turn, tax revenues were enhanced, making the establishment of a public school system, the construction and the staffing of a hospital major successes. Road and harbour facilities development was accelerated. The Samoan colony was on its way to self-sufficiency and had reached that achievement just before Solf was called to Berlin and was succeeded by Erich Schultz as Governor of German Samoa.
Eastern Europe, Brest-Litovsk, and Mitteleuropa
What would life in a CP victory be like in Germany's new sphere of influence? Contrary to popular belief, the Germans were not about to go ham and start Generalplan Osting everyone.
Gasp, you say. The Germans are evil and need the WAllies to pound said evilness out of them! Of course they'll go all Final Solution on everyone! After all, the Nazis didn't come from nowhere, and look at their war crimes and the Herero genocide!
The problems with this argument are numerous. First off, the idea that Germany in WWI was even remotely comparable to the Nazis in brutality and anti-slavism is absurd and quite frankly whitewashes the Nazis. For reference, the Russian Empire lost around 3.3 million people in WW1, or around 1.9% of its population. Of these, 1.5 million, or around 45%, were civilians. Meanwhile, the Soviets lost 27 million people in WW2, of which 19 million, or around 70%, were civilians. That's 15% of its population. When looking at these numbers, it should become clear that the Germans weren't fighting a war of extermination in the east in WW1.
Second, wartime behavior is not the same as peacetime behavior. In war, it becomes a lot easier to justify atrocities due to a siege mentality. If you're not actively under threat, you're not nearly as likely to commit atrocities. And we don't have to speculate; we can look at what the Entente did in OTL. With regards to the Rape of Belgium, modern estimates place the dead at around 6,800 Belgians. The Germans also deported Belgians and Frenchmen to be used as forced labor. However, the French and Russians did the same thing in Alcase-Lorraine and East Prussia, respectively. The Russians looted systematically, deported thousands of people, and killed 1,500+ people. Importantly, reprisals against civilians occured at the same rate as German ones against Belgium. The French behaved similarly in Alcase-Lorraine. As to Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality, Britain did the same thing in Greece and Persia. Now compare that to after the war; there weren't mass atrocities in the Ruhr in 1923 like there were in Alcase-Lorraine in 1914.
What about the east? People often draw comparisons between German expansion eastward in WW1 and WW2 to draw a parallel between the 2nd and 3rd Reichs. I've already pointed out the blatant flaws in this, but regarding the German occupation of Ukraine, it was harsh. During the Hetmanate especially, the Germans conducted reprisals against civilians, established their own courts to try any Ukrainians who committed a "crime" against the German occupiers, arrested any socialist leaders in the Rada, and banned railway workers from striking. And while these measures were harsh, it should be noted that these were wartime measures that would likely have not continued in peacetime. It should also be noted that while the Hetmanate was unpopular and hardly a benign regime, giving land back to wealthy landowners, it wasn't all bad. The economy began to recover slightly, there was relative internal stability, and public health, culture, science, and education were developed. That's not to say the Hetmanate was good by any means, but it wasn't the worst regime either.
People often draw parallels between the Mitteleuropa states in the east and Germany's colonies to show how brutal Germany would be, but I think it's actually an apt comparison to show the opposite. If the Germans invested heavily in health care, infrastructure, and education for their colonies, they'd at least do the same in eastern Europe, especially since eastern Europe is obviously white. The relationship would obviously be extractive and one-sided, with the eastern states having to follow Germany's lead in foreign policy, but they would be able to pretty much run themselves internally. It'd be like a weird mix between the EU and the Warsaw Pact, probably somewhat similar to the British dominion system. Of course, you also avoid Stalin's collectivization and Hitler's rampage, which are both automatically good things. The situation wouldn't be as good as full independence, but it wouldn't be nearly as bad as life under the Tsars, Stalin, or the Nazis.
Broader effects:
Without a second World War, the following things would likely happen:
- Tens of millions of people aren't pointlessly slaughtered
- Electronics and television are introduced more quickly than in OTL, as they were set back by WWII.
- Nuclear power becomes much more widespread much earlier.
- The USSR isn't destroyed demographically and is much healthier economically as well.
- German pop culture would be globally relevant.
- Without the Indian National Congress boycotting the administration of the Raj during the war, the Muslim League doesn't gain nearly as much power as OTL, and thus India is united upon independence.
- With a surviving, if reduced Ottoman Empire and no WWII, the Middle East and Central Asia are likely much more stable.
- People would generally be more liberal without World War II, or at least as liberal as they are today.
- Technology would be around the same as OTL, if not more advanced.
Conclusions
Despite what some would have you believe, a Central Powers victory would not be a dystopian nightmare, and would likely be better than OTL. Of course, WWII and the rise of the Nazis was pretty unlikely, and an Entente victory where the Weimar Republic survives would also be better than OTL. And the optimal scenario is no WWI at all.
If you disagree with what I've said here, feel free to explain why you think I'm wrong, but please do so politely.