After much belaboured time and effort, I have managed to translate one of the few articles I could find on the Haguenin-Kessler discussions on Alsace-Lorraine! The author is Landry Charrier, a historian who focuses on Franco-German relations and has worked for both countries throughout his career. I will post the quotes first in French, then a translation done by AI right below. First, Haguenin was a professor of French Literature in Berlin, and has worked together before 1914 with Jules Cambon, the French ambassador; the Germans saw him as quite reputable and kept in contact with the professor through informal channels while he was in Switzerland. [1] He was by no means an official representative of the French government, but he was interested in developing ideas and solutions to A-L that could assuage the pride, ego, and enmity dividing France and Germany.
Haguenin and Kessler's initial discussions began in December 1916. The two men were well connected with their respective governments and, in Kessler's case, OHL:
Kessler et Haguenin avaient aussi ceci en commun qu’ils disposaient tous deux d’un prestigieux réseau de connaissances remontant aux années d’avant-guerre. Ils connaissaient par ailleurs particulièrement bien les milieux politiques français et allemands et étaient en contacts étroits avec les plus hautes autorités de leur pays : Kessler avait ses entrées à l’ Auswärtiges Amt et au Haut Commandement cependant qu’Haguenin avait des liens privilégiés avec le président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères, Aristide Briand 27 . Ils bénéficiaient en outre d’une (quasi)complète autonomie vis-à- vis de leur délégation respective, de sorte qu’ils furent considérés comme des ambassadeurs parallèles à côté de Conrad von Romberg et de Jean B. P. Beau 28 .
Kessler and Haguenin also shared the fact that they both had a prestigious network of knowledge dating back to the pre-war years. They were also familiar with the French and German political circles and were in close contact with the highest authorities in their country: Kessler had his entries in the Auswärtiges Amt and the High Command although Haguenin had privileged links with the Chairman of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briand 27. They also (almost) complete autonomy in relation to their respective delegations, so that they were regarded as parallel ambassadors alongside Conrad von Romberg and Jean B. P. Beau 28.
Charrier, "d'Une Paix De Compromis," 6.
After being introduced by Annette Kolb, a German pacifist author, who was accompanied by her friend René Schickelé, Haguenin and Kessler met in Bern for multiple cautious conversations:
Il s’agissait aussi pour eux de déterminer jusqu’où Paris et Berlin étaient prêts à aller dans leurs concessions pour résoudre cette question 47 . Favorable à une autonomie de l’Alsace-Lorraine à l’intérieur du Reich – il pensait ce compromis acceptable pour les gouvernements des deux pays 48 –, Kessler déploya une énergie sans commune mesure pour tenter de convaincre ses supérieurs d’emprunter cette voie intermédiaire. Longtemps marginale, cette perspective commençait d’ailleurs à prendre corps au Reichstag et dans certains milieux gouvernementaux 49 . Kessler dut, néanmoins, rapidement se rendre à l’évidence et envisager une nouvelle combinaison pour parvenir à ses fins. Face aux revendications territoriales de sa hiérarchie, il fit donc évoluer sa position et envisagea l’érection d’un Royaume de Souabe comprenant l’Alsace-Lorraine, le Bade et le Wurtemberg, une proposition là aussi accueillie avec beaucoup de réserves par Berlin 50 .
It was also for them to determine how far Paris and Berlin were prepared to go in their concessions to solve this issue 47. In favour of Alsace-Lorraine’s autonomy within the Reich – he felt that the compromise was acceptable to the governments of the two countries 48 – Kessler deployed unparalleled energy in an attempt to persuade his superiors to take this intermediate path. For a long time this perspective was beginning to take shape in the Reichstag and in some governmental circles 49. Kessler, however, had to quickly give in to the obvious and consider a new combination in order to his goals. In the face of the territorial claims of his hierarchy, he therefore changed his position and envisaged the erection of a Kingdom of Swabia comprising Alsace-Lorraine, Baden and Württemberg, a proposal also welcomed with great reservations by Berlin 50.
Charrier, "d'Une Paix De Compromis," 9.
Paradoxically, Kessler felt himself undermined by Wilson and Bethmann-Hollweg's respective "peace offensives" that occurred in January 1917, as the prospect of general talks that touched on not just A-L but every point of contention in WWI made it impossible to specifically discuss the lost provinces. [2] Charrier's stance on Haguenin and Kessler's sincerity seems to be that it was in preparation for the worst case scenario on the French side, while for the Germans it was a chance to split the Anglo-French Entente, though he does note the following:
« mais que les contacts sont interrompus, dès qu’il apparaît que les buts de guerre devraient être abandonnés vis-à-vis de cette puissance et que les négociateurs seraient susceptibles de parvenir à un règlement général. 63
“but the contacts are interrupted, as soon as it appears that the war goals should be abandoned to that power and that the negotiators would be likely to reach a general settlement.”
Charrier, "d'Une Paix De Compromis," 12.
Which suggests that the hurdle was not the sheer impossibility of reaching common ground, but that neither side wanted to find out what said common ground would look like.
Malgré l’échec de ses échanges avec Haguenin, Kessler ne renonça pas pour autant aux espoirs qui avaient motivé ses démarches de l’hiver 1916-1917 et l’avaient amené à agir bien au-delà de ce que l’ Auswärtiges Amt pouvait attendre de lui. Il chercha à nouveau le contact avec des personnalités françaises qu’il pensait favorables à la conclusion d’une « paix honorable » – c’est-à-dire, une paix de compromis – lorsque Paul Painlevé fut, le temps d’un court intermède, installé aux commandes du Gouvernement (12 septembre-13 novembre 1917) 65 . Pour ce faire, il utilisa le formidable réseau de connaissances qu’il s’était forgé au cours des années ayant précédé la guerre. C’est ainsi qu’il put échanger avec le président du Conseil dont il pensait – à juste titre 66 – que la détermination n’était qu’une façade masquant des positions favorables à une paix négociée : « Painlevé se présente comme un inflexible défenseur de la guerre. Cependant, ceci n’est de mon point de vue qu’une façade. 67 »
Despite the failure of his exchanges with Haguenin, Kessler did not give up the hopes that had motivated his steps in the winter of 1916-1917 and led him to act well beyond what the Auswärtiges Amt could expect from him. He again sought contact with French personalities whom he thought favourable to the conclusion of a “honourable peace” – that is, a peace of compromise – when Paul Painlevé was, at the time of a short intermediate, installed at the command of the Government (12 September-13 November 1917) 65. To do this, he used the formidable network of knowledge he had forged in the years before the war. Thus he was able to communicate with the chairman of the Council, whom he thought – quite rightly 66 – that determination was only a façade masking positions in favour of a negotiated peace: “Painlevé presents himself as an inflexible defender of war. However, from my point of view, this is only a facade. 67”
Charrier, "d'Une Paix De Compromis," 12-13.
Haguenin and Kessler exchanged a very large number of correspondences, and up until Kühlmann finally rejected compromise on A-L due to Villalobar's probe failing to reach Lloyd George, Kessler had hope that Painlevé could pick up where Briand had left off. Should negotiations for an armistice take place, Kessler could easily revive the various proposals he had mooted with Haguenin (i.e. autonomy, demilitarization, economic cooperation, shared government, etc.) and help to bring it about.
This took a very, very long time, and I don't think I'd be able to dig much deeper than this when it comes to what A-L would look like in the final peace. Other articles by Georges-Henri Soutou are all in French (some of which are themselves embedded in German publications), while the one English chapter on "Diplomacy" in a Cambridge History text doesn't go into more detail than the 1914-1918 Encyclopedia itself. The exact details would probably have to be winged! If any of y'all are French speakers, I'd super appreciate if you could find out more about this topic.
Meanwhile, according to Gerhard Ritter's
Sword and Sceptre, Colonel House's mission to Europe found out that Albert I was willing to arrange a treaty with Germany over the Congo, [3] either to be sold in return for a large indemnity [4] (unlikely, given British apprehensions) or for German businesses to be given indirect commercial access to the colony. DISCLAIMER: I am aware of Ritter's...interesting political beliefs - conservative, monarchist, and authoritarian to name a few - which definitely impacts his objectivity, but I checked his bibliography and it does seem that House's report existed. Ritter cites Arthur S. Link's
Wilson series, Volume 4, Chapter 4, which contains a trove of papers and letters collected by one of the President's leading biographers. I'll also throw in some additional details on Togoland, which was widely seen by the European empires as a sort of "model colony" before the war. [5] Since Togoland interfered with neither South African claims nor a Cape-Cairo Railway, Kühlmann stood the best chance of regaining this colony above all others. But the Germans were rather harsh and severe to the locals, and they actually welcomed the Anglo-French colonial forces as liberators. [6] I doubt the natives would be chuffed if they are being handed back to Germany in return for A-L, and there might be unpleasant pacification efforts in Togoland that calls into question the Entente's own attitudes towards colonialism. Do they condemn the Boches for their brutality, or stay quiet lest their own African colonies get ideas?
[1] Charrier, "d'Une Paix De Compromis," 3-4.
[2] Charrier, "d'Une Paix De Compromis," 10.
[3] Ritter,
Sword and Scepter, 242.
[4] Ritter,
Sword and Scepter, 525.
[5] Laumann, "Historiography of German Togoland," 195.
[6] Laumann, "Historiography of German Togoland," 197.
Charrier, Landry. “À La Recherche d'Une Paix De Compromis: Kessler, Haguenin Et La Diplomatie Officieuse De l'Hiver 1916-1917.”
Histoire@Politique 11 (2010): 1-14.
www.histoire- politique.fr.
- Laumann, Dennis. “A Historiography of German Togoland, or the Rise and Fall of a ‘Model Colony.’” History in Africa 30 (2003): 195–211. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3172089.
Ritter, Gerhard. The Sword and the Scepter, the Problem of Militarism in Germany, Volume III: The Tragedy of Statesmanship - Bethmann-Hollweg as War Chancellor (1914-1917). Translated by Heinz Norden. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1972.
It's also possible that seeing that most of the army is demobilized and that Germany is returning to peace economy that they understand that a proletarian revolution won't happen in Germany.
Perhaps, though I personally ascribe a great deal of ideological fanaticism to the Russian revolutionaries that might blind them from reality - assuming that Lenin could convince the Bolshevik Party's Central Committee to sign an earlier Brest-Litovsk through sheer force of personality (or by threatening to resign), this still leaves the All-Russian Central Executive Committee with no less than 200 delegates to wrangle in line. Many of the Committee members belonged to the Left SR, who hated the idea of peace so much that in OTL July 1918 they assassinated the German ambassador to Soviet Russia, Mirbach, in explicit hopes of sparking a new war with the Kaiser which neither the Revolution nor the country could afford. Would figures like Maria Spiridonova really become pragmatic or foresighted all of a sudden without Operation Faustschlag just because Germany is negotiating with the Entente? If anything, the Reds would take it as a huge admission of German weakness, and think that surely they could outlast an invasion once the Heer has shrunk in size. I truly think Russia's decision to surrender could go either way.
Having the UK and Germany as Co Belligerents, if not actually Allies, on the Eastern Front with the UK's intervention against the Soviets might also tip them into wanting some sort of peace. Having the German fleet take responsibility for the Baltic and supporting actions in Finland with German troops and the UK fleet taking on Murmansk and the White Sea ports, even having some German Troops sent there to help the British troops, sends a message. If Turkey feels threatened by the Soviets might there be some help coming from the Germans and UK in some form? The US and Japan are intervening in the Far East and you might not see any British troops except maybe a little bit from India in support.
No. Turkey was supported by the RSFSR in their war of independence with Greece and even if the Ottomans survive they won't do much more than minor support to the Whites and independence movements in the Caucasus, a full scale war is unimaginable in their current state.
While it is tempting to make the socialists out to be a common bogeyman that the Entente and Central Powers could cooperate against, this did not seem to have been the prevailing view in Germany and the Bolshevik Party in OTL 1918. Lenin as mentioned elsewhere in this thread was willing to do anything to help the Revolution endure, including open collaboration with OHL against the Entente in Murmansk. [7] Wilhelm II...actually agreed with Lenin. In one of the many examples of the Kaiser's erratic and poorly thought out approach to diplomacy, he wanted to, in his own words, "stand behind them with support and hence both will have to behave!", [8] preferring to use the Bolsheviks as a cudgel and apparently useful puppet alongside the Finns. I don't believe that the Reds would go gently into the night by letting the Entente and Central Powers double-team them, particularly when being led by as remarkable a survivor as Lenin.
[7] Herwig, "Anti-Bolshevik Crusade," 349.
[8] Herwig, "Anti-Bolshevik Crusade," 347.
However, the aforementioned Left SRs could outright switch sides to join the White Russians and Entente against the Germans, Bolsheviks, and maybe Finns (talk about a chaotic alignment!). This wouldn't have been without precedent; the Komuch in Samara was comprised of Constituent Assembly delegates and SR members while being led by Kappel, a monarchist general. The Left SRs had teeth of their own, too - the SR Uprising in Moscow in July 1918 OTL had more than enough military strength to secure the city, they just did not because Spiridonova preferred to give speeches than orders for Cheka troops loyal to the SRs to march against Lenin's Latvian Riflemen. If Petrograd had fallen, the Bolsheviks were forced to flee, and there is a large power vacuum, its a whole new ball game. And this analysis did not even include Makhno's Black anarchists or the roaming bands of Green peasant armies fighting every side in the civil war.
Re: the debate on whether Ottoman support was required and/or desired by the Entente in order to give foreign aid to their White proxies, my take is that the British would make opening the Bosporus Straits a precondition for any peace treaty - if Lloyd George wants to throw Wilson a bone, he could support the President's call for absolute freedom of navigation on the seas and thus justify gaining access to the Black Sea. I do think that, on the whole, Denikin and Wrangel's Volunteer Army would receive less arms, munitions, and funding from the Entente due to the Ottomans remaining a going concern, while the likes of Krasnov would gain more from Germany. The volume of maritime travel through the Straits simply couldn't be the same as OTL where the Treaty of Sèvres placed the region under international authority. Not to mention that even if the Entente by some miracle worked out an agreement with the Ottomans against the Reds, the Turks would have demanded the independence of separatist states in the Caucasus (i.e. Georgia, Azerbaijan) as their price. With friends like these, who needs enemies?
This might result in the Cossacks flocking to Krasnov over Denikin, with a lack of material backing from Britain and ugly compromises made on Russia's behalf undermining the already sparse support the Volunteer Army could garner from Russian peasantry and proletariat. At least, a more pragmatic leader like Wrangel might rise to the fore as someone more willing to cut deals where needed as opposed to the rigid Denikin. If we adhere to the principles of self-determination, Skoropadskyi's Ukrainian State had de facto control over the Crimea and Kuban, and his regime would probably attract the bulk of anti-Red fighters that the Entente propped up OTL. Since the Black Sea (and, for that matter, the Baltic too) is less accessible here, Anglo-French-American efforts might pivot to the North Russia intervention and assist Miller? If the Entente focus the aid they provided to Denikin and Yudenich OTL to Miller's Provisional Government of the Northern Region, including loans and tanks, that might allow Murmansk and Archangelsk to prevail against the Reds. Especially if the soviets implode after Germany takes Petrograd.
On another note, the Ottomans indeed were anti-Bolshevik OTL, but Enver Pasha's attention was quixotically directed at the Basmachi Rebellion in Khiva, Bukhara, and Turkestan, where he was encouraging more Islamic separatism from the moribund Russian Empire. This makes it less likely that the Entente and Ottomans could meet halfway, IMO; even if both powers saw the socialists as their enemy, they simply had different priorities and strategic objectives that were incompatible with each other.
They don't have to give direct support, they just need to not prevent the supporting powers from giving it to the Whites and making it easier for them to support the Whites. With this I also envision the Ottomans losing the Hejaz, some parts of Jordan and maybe Jerusalem, Lebanon, and maybe some of Syria along the coast but not necessarily Damascus. One of the things that has to be dealt with is if the Entente finds out about the Armenian Genocide and if they want a independent Armenian state. Part of the support for the Whites might be them asking for the creation of an Armenian state to help them with their position even without the Armenian genocide.
These losses make sense for a reduced Ottoman Empire. I would include the Emirate of Nejd gaining independence from Istanbul alongside the Hejaz, but the Ottomans probably hold on to the Syrian coastline since the British had not pushed far enough north to demand its acquisition on France's behalf, and because it makes for awkward borders. The Emirate of Jabal Shammar likely remains an Ottoman buffer against the newly independent Arab states. Mesopotamia was lost, but as the British had not progressed beyond Baghdad and the Ottomans had regrouped at Mosul by late 1917, alt-Iraq would probably be smaller than Mandatory Iraq was OTL to account for Turkish security concerns. Tragically, Russia as you pointed out had been Armenia's greatest patron, and as long as Germany stood behind the Ottomans (in the Reichstag, only Erzberger and Liebknecht spoke up to defend Armenia), the Entente was not in a position to do anything about the Genocide. Asking Enver Pasha to cede Egypt, Palestine, and Mesopotamia would already be a hard sell; he would never have consented to an independent Armenia just because some reactionary Russians that don't even control Moscow asked him to. I don't see the Ottomans gaining a conscience for the blood on their hands anytime soon.
But a truce at the Western Front would have significant consequences in Russia and the Grand Duchy as well. The OTL Finnish Civil War was caused by very specific chain of events, and such a major butterfly would reshuffle the situation quite a bit. For starters, the Petrograd Ingrian Finnish Bolsheviks loyal to Lenin were pivotal in taking over the SDP leadership and launching the revolution. If there is a truce at West, the dynamic in the Eastern Front and Petrograd changes completely. Without Lenin, there is no organised attempt to push the cautious SDP leadership aside, and the country is in a situation where the Red Guards are arming themselves, but the SDP leadership refuses to start a revolt. Meanwhile the Suojeluskunta movement is still aiming to primarily overthrow the Russian garrisons with German support instead of attacking the Red Guards, which became the main perceived enemy only after August, when Oskari Tokoi had turned down the offers of cooperation from the secret Military Committee.
Hm, fair enough. You clearly know more than me about Finnish history! Would you say that there's a chance for the Social Democrats to cement their control over Finland, and hence better able to present themselves as a potential ally to the Entente? I suppose in my "headcanon" timeline, events on the Eastern Front with regards to Lenin stay roughly the same as OTL until the Germans carry out Operation Schlußstein sometime after TTL March 1918, so the beginning of the Finnish Civil War in January is not butterflied away. Kühlmann's negotiations with the Entente would take time, and they'd only start in mid-October 1917 at the earliest; it took half a year for Versailles to be settled OTL, so it'd be generous to assume a peace by Christmas. The Bolsheviks might still be able to stir up trouble, and their historical pattern of behaviour was always to shoot/coup first and ask questions later (in show trials).
The geography of the region makes attempts to move all the way to Murmansk a pipe dream, considering the Entente forces present. The attacking force would have to fight their way northwards along a single railroad track and a dirt track in the middle of wilderness totally unsuited for WW1-type warfare. There are no Eastern-Western roads large enough to support forces larger than regiments, and the closest railheads in the West are at Joensuu. The Finnish would very much want a Greater Finland, but they (and the Germans) lack the military means to bring it about unless Russian resistance collapses completely.
The plan to advance along the railway was something I got from OHL's historical plans, [9] but name a better duo than German operational planning and blatant disregard for logistics. I think that a total Russian collapse could still occur if Petrograd falls to Hoffmann's advance, but as I mused above, maybe Miller could receive support from not just the Entente, but also a coalition of local soviets, SRs, and Whites who want to resist Germany to the end? The Russian "heartland" (the industrial centres occupied by the Reds OTL such as Moscow, Smolensk, Tsaritsyn, etc.) would be in a free-for-all TTL, and a whole timeline might be needed to sketch out where the chips fall. The Bolsheviks were the best disciplined faction but would have suffered a tremendous blow from Germany's attack; the SRs were the most widely popular party amongst the peasantry but seemed hopeless at organizing themselves; the Whites were the friendliest figures for potential foreign backers but lacked public legitimacy and a coherent political platform. I'd be curious in any outcome that isn't just a rehash of OTL!
[9] Herwig, "Anti-Bolshevik Crusade," 352.
